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1 
On Sunday, 17 March, 2015, the Northwood and Pinner Liberal Synagogue of the 
north London neighbourhood of Northwood did something most synagogues will do 
once in their lifetimes, if they are lucky – they completed the writing of a new scroll 
of Torah, the key Jewish sacred text and, as such, the most significant liturgical object 
in Jewish worship. This chapter will describe and analyse the ritual welcoming of that 
scroll to the community. 
 In doing so, I hope also to demonstrate the ways in which the discipline of 
performance studies can offer helpful complement to linguistic and anthropological 
models of the study of religion. The discipline of performance studies developed out 
of theatre studies in the 1960s and 1970s out of a conversation between cultural 
anthropology and the experimental theatre and performance art world that was 
questioning the nature of artistic action at the time, especially in the galleries and 
small theatres of downtown New York. But in recent years, that link between the 
social scientific study of performance and its artistic cousin has become strained to 
the breaking point. The initial impulse that those who study religious ritual and those 
who study performance are working with overlapping sets of material is, of course, 
completely correct. The two disciplines have developed distinct interests and 
analytical methods in the past half century each of which, I would argue, could benefit 
from a dialogue with the other. In working through this example, then, I hope to 
indicate how this dialogue might be academically useful.  
 I will begin with a brief description of the ceremony, and then offer an 
analysis of it from both the anthropological and the performative perspectives, before 
offering an analysis that attempts an integration of the two. The welcoming ceremony 
is called a hachnesat sefer torah; literally, the ‘bringing in of a book of torah,’ and it 
was designed to commemorate the completion of the writing of a new formal Torah 
scroll that would be used in the synagogue’s worship. (The Torah, which literally 
means ‘teaching,’ is the first five books of the Hebrew Bible.) A torah is traditionally 
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written by hand on animal-skin parchment by a master scribe called a sofer and bound 
as a scroll around two elaborately decorated wooden supports.  
 The event began in the synagogue itself, where, in the sanctuary, the almost-
finished scroll was laid out on a table under the chuppah, or wedding canopy. One 
after another, individually or in families, members and their families were invited up 
to hold the sofer’s hand as he filled in one of the final few dozen letters of the scroll. 
Each time, the sofer had a small chat with the person holding his arm, chose an 
appropriate letter, and offered a blessing. This took a while, and the atmosphere was 
informal; people stood around, angled for a better view, chatted, took photos, or went 
to the next room for tea and cake.  
 When the last word had been finished, the sofer rolled the scroll back to the 
Ten Commandments, and asked the synagogue’s senior rabbi to read them out loud. 
This done, the congregation of several dozen took up the newly completed scroll, 
wrapped it in white, and paraded it down the stairs and out onto the streets of 
Northwood under a makeshift canopy of a prayer shawl on four sticks (this, too, 
invokes a wedding canopy). The procession was led by the rabbi on guitar, and the 
group sang the sort of simple, traditional Hebrew songs one might find at a Jewish 
wedding or other celebration.  
 The procession went down the main street of Northwood, past shops and pubs 
and bus stops and quite a few surprised and confused locals. (There were half a dozen 
Metropolitan Police officers across the street, watching the situation.) The procession 
stopped in front of a tree next to a public parking lot. There, the senior rabbi explained 
that the mother of the tree they were standing in front of had been planted by a teacher 
and her young students at in January of 1943 in the Theresinstadt concentration camp, 
which served as a symbol of hope, nurtured by each successive group of children who 
passed through. After the war, it was moved to Terezin Cemetary as a memorial. Two 
members of the Northwood synagogue had taken seedlings from the tree when they 
visited in 1996, had nourished them at their homes in London, and one of those had 
grown into this tree here.1 This was all the more poignant as the original Terezin tree 
had been destroyed by flooding in 2004. The assembled group recited the Kaddish, 
the traditional Jewish prayer for the dead, and then turned around and paraded back 
into the synagogue with more songs of praise and thanksgiving (all in Hebrew, and 
most of which, of course, take their text from the very Torah being brought in). There, 
the scroll was paraded around the crowded room, with still more song, until it was 
brought under the canopy to join its sister scrolls (that is, the older scrolls that the 
synagogue was already using). The most basic of Jewish prayers, the Shema, was 
                                                 
1  The other grows now at Beth Shalom, the Holocaust Centre in Nottinghamshire, 
England. 
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recited and sung, and a few more blessings of thanksgiving and praise were spoken 
and sung (a few in English, composed for the occasion). The new scroll and the old on 
were put away, and with a final prayer, the events was over. Most people went home, 
though a few lingered for cups of tea.  
  
  
2 
Most scholars of religion would initially look to textual precedents for this ritual – 
which is not unreasonable for an event that, quite literally, celebrates a text. The key 
precedent within the biblical text itself is II Samuel 6, which describes the arrival of 
the Ark of the Covenant in Jerusalem. At that ceremony, musical instruments were 
played and King David danced ‘with all his might’ (2 Samuel 6:14). This connection, 
then, would be made between the Biblical Ark, which biblical tradition claims 
contained the stone tablets of law given to Moses on Mount Sinai, and the Ark of the 
contemporary synagogue, which contains the torah scrolls which, too, are taken in 
some sense ‘from Sinai.’ Such scholars would place this ceremony in this centuries-
old tradition of celebration as well as other ritual acts of scribal work and reverence 
for the Torah (restrictions on how it can be carried, stored, read, and so on), whether 
or not the participants that day in Northwood had any knowledge of these precedents. 
Scholars likely would compare this ritual to other ritual traditions that used similar 
symbolic elements such as the canopy, repeated circular processions, and joyous 
group dancing: the annual commemoration of the revelation on Sinai known as 
Simchat Torah, but most importantly, Jewish wedding ceremonies. The explanation 
here, again, would be textual: the common biblical and Rabbinic image of God as 
groom and the Jewish people as bride, with the Torah as the ring which binds them.  
 Much of the focus here would also be on the key symbols present in the 
ceremony, symbols which, in the minds of some anthropologists, may be culturally 
specific but can equally point to trans-cultural patterns of religious understanding. In 
the Hachnesat, the Torah is the obvious such symbol. While of course is it a 
quintessentially Jewish symbol, it would be hard not to see it as what Mercea Eliade 
called an axis mundi—a central pillar around which the world is organized and, 
literally, revolves, a connection between heaven and earth, and frequently the site of 
revelation or the (past or ongoing) presence of a divinity. Eliade sees the Hindu 
lingam as one of these, the Aboriginal totem, the Kaba’a in Mecca, the Cross on 
Calvary, and so on. When the Torah is processed, with the tribe following it, being 
danced around, and serenaded with references to it with the traditional name Etz 
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Chayim, the Tree of Life, the theory fits too well not to deserve a mention.2 It would 
also o accident that the memory of Terezin is also a tree, a tree of life in another sense, 
and that one tree needs to visit and pay symbolic homage to its predecessor. 
 
 Those anthropologists who did not see ritual as a mere contemporary working-
out of ancient text might also see in this the liberal Jewish liturgical tradition that has 
developed since the late 19th century in Germany, and then in the UK and US. They 
would note in particular the use of guitar and the particular songs sung as the legacy 
of Debbie Friedman and the new, folk-rock sensibility she injected into liberal 
Judaism through guitar-led song circles at American summer camps in the 1980s.3 
They may look at the age range of participants and realise that the current crop of 
young leaders – now in their 30s and 40s – were the ones most influenced by this 
development, and note that two of the three rabbis leading this congregation fall 
firmly in that demographic. 
 The more comparative amongst them would also make connections to other 
religious rituals of celebration and completion, such as harvest festivals and 
ceremonies of thanksgiving for military victories. They might also see a link to rites 
of passage, as the Hachnesat is literally an inauguration, where a new and recognized 
social status is created: what begins as a piece of parchment becomes holy scripture.  
The procession, moving from set-apart sacred space through the public streets and 
back into the sacred space, would echo ceremonies of victory or sovereignty. Like 
similar processions of statues or images of the gods or saints (or their relics) through 
the public streets in Hindu, Buddhist, and Catholic traditions, it both marks an 
important event in the life of the religious community and the assertion of some sense 
of the primacy of the sacred over the secular sphere. These scholars would also likely 
note how extraordinarily rare such public assertions are in diaspora Judaism, at least 
outside of Orthodox enclaves with a majority-Jewish population. They would also 
note that, unlike harvest festivals or many carnivals, this was not an annual event but 
a once-in-a-generation one, and that it is likely it was the only one any of its 
participants ever had (or ever would) participate in. That might helpfully 
contextualize this unusual and hard to account for assertion of primacy (which most 
participants would deny was something they wanted to assert).  
                                                 
2  This would only be encouraged by the fact that the Northwood and Pinner Liberal 
Synagogue’s (seldom-used) formal Hebrew name is Etz Chayim.  
3  I have discussed this further in ‘The Debbie Friedman Problem: Performing Tradition, 
Memory and Modernity in Today’s Progressive Jewish Liturgy’, Liturgy 28 (2013), no. 1, pp. 
6-17.  
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 What this contextualization does necessarily do is to place this ritual into an 
ontological or structural category called ‘ritual,’ one which is inherently different 
from other categories of human action (such as, for example, aesthetic performance). 
This might not have been the case a century ago, where structuralist influences from 
Claude Lévi-Strauss or Emile Durkheim. Contemporary scholars are less likely to see 
such categories as holding a necessary, transcultural or universal status. Instead, they 
may treat these categories as emic and negotiable, looking for evidence of their use 
within the anthropological record. For the Hachnesat, that internal categorization does 
exist—the location, liturgical language, and other factors clearly place it within the 
category of Jewish worship— but its movement outside of the synagogue and guitar-
based music do question that somewhat.  
 In her influential work, ritual theorist Catherine Bell has described and 
critiqued the tradition in religious studies of using the concept of ‘ritual’ as a means of 
synthesising the antithetical dichotomy of thought and action.4 As she describes, 
however, this attempt to understand ritual as the union of thought and action is only 
temporarily effective; soon, ritual becomes condemned as meaningless action 
(‘empty’) and the primacy of thought over action is reasserted. The problem here is 
that this assertion of primary has a difficult political history; it has been associated 
with a Protestant supremacist attitude which has been linked both with anti-
Catholicism and the cultural denigration of non-Christian religious life worldwide. 
The valorizing of verbally-articulated belief and theology over lived action has had 
and continues to have the effect of privileging western Protestant notions of religion 
over others. Bell notes that too many of her colleagues fail to take account of the 
political effect of their own work: 
Ritual studies, as a recent mode of discourse, has claimed an 
odd exemption from the general critique that scholarship 
distorts and exploits, tending to see itself, by virtue of its 
interest in ritual performance per se, as somehow able to 
transcend the politics of those who study and those who are 
studied.5 
                                                 
4  See Catherine Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992).  
5  Bell, Ritual Theory, ix. While Bell does not discuss this herself, I notice that same 
dynamic at work in the dichotomy between ‘religious’ and ‘spiritual’ which has, in recent 
decades, has seemed to gain an interpretative utility in the post-secular West. Those 
(generally Westerners) who are happy to identify themselves as ‘spiritual,’ in opposition to 
those (often non-Westerners, or at least those with less sophistication) who practice rote or 
traditional or stifling ‘religion’ are perhaps offering an uncomfortable echo of these earlier, 
exclusivist claims. The idea that spiritual experience is somehow more ‘authentic’ or ‘sincere’ 
 6 
As a less problematic alternative, she suggests that scholars should shift their focus 
from the category of ritual to the processes of ritualization—that is, the means by 
which ordinary acts are marked out as extraordinary and as functioning at a 
supramundane level.6 Bell spells out the processes by which ritualization tends to take 
place—formalism, invariance, traditionalism, rule-governance, and so on. In our case, 
this list enables us to talk about how the Hachnesat has been ritualized to a large 
degree, but not entirely. The casual conversation and tea while the first letters were 
being completed, the exit from the sacred space, and the relative casualness of the 
dancing, singing and conversation are ways in which the event was less ritualized than 
perhaps it could have been.  
 Not all religious scholars are as skeptical as Bell at the possibilities of trans-
cultural religious categories, and some might use examples of rituals such as the 
Hachnesat as a case study to further define the category of ‘religion’. Perhaps the 
most-often cited definition of the term in contemporary cultural anthropology is from 
Clifford Geertz, the prominent American anthropological semioticist. His definition 
of religion refers to ‘a system of symbols’ which serve to establish stable ‘moods and 
motivations’ in people through the formation of concepts of a ‘general order of 
existence’ that have such an ‘aura of factuality’ as to seem ‘uniquely realistic.’7 For 
my purposes here, it is worth focusing on that last key phrase. Geertz’s idea is that 
religion is grounded in a highly potent reality affect; one that makes the religious able 
to assert a claim to a truth more fundamental than that which comes from other 
sources (our senses, our reasoning, other cultural forms, etc.). With the Hachnesat, 
that can be seen in the powerful communal affect facilitated by the dancing, singing, 
pageantry, and so on Amongst other things, that makes religion inherently political, as 
it provides an unarticulable—and thus unquestionable—ground for social life and thus 
political life. And so you’ll find that many religious scholars often show a skepticism 
of claims to the holy, because of the awareness of how this reality of religion has 
provided a justification for oppression and violence over the centuries. If the holy is 
uniquely realistic, it is impervious to discussion or argument, which is why it is 
frequently surrounded by prohibitions and taboos. We can see this tension in the slight 
                                                                                                                                            
than religious experience—without ever being too precise about the difference between those 
categories—is a concerning one that I think echoes Bell’s concern. In my experience, though 
it would be ridiculous to deny the spirituality of Indian religions, the term ‘spirituality’ (as 
opposed to ‘religion’ has no real resonance for my Indian colleagues. The term functions for 
the West, as is its design.  
6  This is discussed more fully in her Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions (Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1997).  
7  Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (London: Hachette, 1973), 90. I have 
abbreviated Geertz’s definition somewhat for the sake of focus.  
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discomfort of moving the Hachnesat into secular public space, and thus seeming to 
make some sort of ill-defined claim to primacy. At least in one occasion, a London 
Hachnesat has, in fact, led to a successful criminal lawsuit.8 This question of how to 
negotiate this ‘uniquely realistic’ property of religion is one that performance scholars 
might be able to usefully comment on, and so I will return to it below. 
 
 
3 
In contrast to this anthropological reading, let us now consider what might be the 
focus of a more traditional performance studies reading of these events might focus 
on. There are a few main themes that immediately leap to mind. 
  First, one would expect to find a focus on the social framing of the event, and 
how this framing provided starting points for the forms of interpersonal connection 
that it evoked, asserted and questioned. The Hachnesat was performed by, and 
(initially) within, a longstanding religious congregation where most members knew 
each other well, had celebrated major milestones in their lives together, and identified 
themselves not just as fellow Jews, but as members of the same community. The 
performance was framed as a celebration and commemoration by that community; 
they were its authors, its participants, and its primary audience.9 It broke that framing, 
                                                 
8  The case was a noise nuisance complaints against a Hassidic rabbi in the London 
borough of Hackney in 2007. While the magistrate found against the rabbi initially, the 
decision was reversed by the Crown Court on appeal, some of which depended on the exact 
nature of ‘nuisance.’ While the case does not, on the face of it, appear to be about a religious 
claim to primacy over the public sphere, Samantha Knights argues that noise regulations in 
diverse cities do offer an interesting test case for the rights of religious acts to occupy (sonic) 
public space. See Samantha Knights, ‘Sacred Space and the City: Religious Buildings and 
Noise Pollution.’ Harvard International Law Journal 49 (2008), p. 50-55. For more on the 
political challenge posed by religious action in public space, see Claire Chambers, Simon du 
Toit and Joshua Edelman, eds., Performing Religion in Public (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013).  
9  Some performance scholars might suggest that, like much prayer, the ‘true’ or 
‘ultimate’ audience here is a divine one, and the human audience simply stands as a witness to 
that outside communication. (Many theologians, especially Christian ones, would agree; 
Kevin Vanhoozer, though frustratingly hard to pin down, makes more or less this argument in 
his The Drama of Doctrine (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005)). This, though, 
is not a fair reading of this event. Many of the Hebrew texts offer prayer or thanks to God, 
often addressing God in the second person. While these texts were translated in the service 
booklets provided (and sometimes theatre translations were read out), there was no discussion 
of God in the English texts composed or in the sermons, talks and explanations by the rabbis 
on the day. Liberal Judaism, the movement to which this synagogue belongs, does not 
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however, by entering the secular public realm, an extremely unusual act for a piece of 
Jewish worship, especially for a liberal synagogue in a neighbourhood in which Jews 
are a fairly small minority.10 A wider sense of historical and geographic community 
was invoked through the ceremony at the Terezen Tree, but the centrality of that local, 
tight-knit community was solidified by returning to the synagogue, the use of well-
known songs and participatory singing, and the constant proxemic and even haptic 
connections between community members and with event’s central object (or prop, in 
performance studies terms), the Torah scroll.   
 Next, performance analysis would focus on a quite particular relationship: that 
between what, in theatrical terms, would be called the relationship between 
performers and spectators. Like much contemporary experimental theatre, the 
Hachnesat does not have a clear delineation between active participant and passive 
watcher, but, also like experimental theatre, it was built on a pre-written script known 
to, and enacted by, one set of participants more than the others. As is the case for 
professional actors, the congregation’s rabbis participate the event with the benefit of 
their expertise and as part of their professional employment, while congregants, like 
audience members, are assumed to have a lower level of expertise and have paid for 
the privilege of participation (either directly, through tickets, or indirectly, through 
paying an annual membership to the synagogue).11 But this leadership is often 
remarkably camouflaged; aside from a few speeches, the majority of the ritual 
involves congregational participation on what appear to be equal terms with the rabbis. 
Many people are invited to fill letters in; the community as a whole sings and dances 
and recites prayers together, even if it is a rabbi who plays the guitar. Performance 
scholars have recently paid attention to the ways in which, within the limits of the 
frame set and enforced by the professionals, participants are invited to contribute their 
own words, actions, or even opinions, which then become part of the ritual. That 
invitation itself is important and affectively significant, even if it does not lead to a 
                                                                                                                                            
necessarily assume that all of its members (or rabbis) believe in God. It would be a mistake to 
equate the grammatical addressee of the prayers said with the audience of the event. 
10  In the 2011 UK census, 6.6% of Northwood’s 10,465 residents identified themselves 
as Jewish. 
11  Whether or not we should call that first group professionals or ‘passionate amateurs’ 
in the sense that Nicholas Ridout develops is another question; the point is that they were 
positioned as experts in the event. See his Passionate Amateurs: Theatre, Communism and 
Love (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2013).  
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radical change in the shape of the event itself, or the power structure that underlies 
it.12 
 The focus on this relationship can lead, with relative ease, to a discussion of 
the nature of community. While all the participants of the Hachnesat, lay or clerical, 
are physically, proxemically and emotionally involved in its unfolding,  it remains 
scripted. The invitation is to join in communally: with another person’s act of writing, 
to listen to a speech, to sing along, and to follow a procession. In this ritual, like other 
communal rituals, the philosopher Jacques Rancière might see the assertion of 
community which argued prevented the critical distance necessary for the 
redistribution of the sensible.13 Here is where performance scholars would point to the  
both to the institutional framing and the formal structure of an event as necessarily 
linked to its critical and affective potential. Institutionally, there are certain venues, 
festivals and so on that house self-consciously avant-garde contemporary theatre, 
work which tends to approach the relationships it builds between its performers and 
spectators as itself material that it can deal with creatively and critically. The right to 
do that critical work, even when it is uncomfortable, is part of the bargain that 
contemporary theatre audiences make with the performers they watch.14 The 
hachnesat, in contrast, is a celebration set within an established community, and as 
such, there is no need to critically interrogate the pre-existing, functional and healthy 
relationships within that community. Formally, a performance scholar would note the 
predominance of singing within the Hachnesat, and note that the musical frame of a 
song leaves less room for critical engagement than spoken or written language. In 
1974, the anthropologist Maurice Bloch coined a mantra in the study of religious 
performance: ‘you cannot argue with a song.’15 Bloch was not arguing that a song 
cannot advocate for and encourage ideas or positions that ought to be scrutinized. 
Rather, the medium is just too limited; there is no linguistic or musicological space 
                                                 
12  The recent development of immersive theatre has encouraged this scholarly attention. 
One of the best sources is Gareth White, Audience Participation in Theatre: The Aesthetics of 
the Invitation (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013).  
13  See Jacques Rancieèe, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics (London: Continuum, 
2010).   
14  Two experimental theatre companies which take full and fascinating advantage of this 
right are Ontroerend Goed, from Flanders, and Blast Theory, from England. See, amongst 
others, Liesbeth Groot Nibbelink, ‘Radical Intimacy: Ontroerend Goed Meets The 
Emancipated Spectator,’ Contemporary Theatre Review 22, no 3 (2012), pp. 412-420 and 
Steve Benford and Gabriella Giannachi, Performing Mixed Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2011). 
15  Maurice Bloch, ‘Symbols, Song, Dance, and Features of Articulation: Is religion an 
extreme form of traditional authority?’ European Journal of Sociology 15, no 1 (1974), p. 71. 
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within songs for argumentative engagement. They are not propositions defended; they 
are assertions reiterated.16  
 While a performance scholar might take a formally agnostic stance as to which 
is more valuable, the critical artistic work or the celebratory community one, it is 
likely that there would be a subtle or not-so-subtle valorizing of the critical work as 
more interesting or intellectually engaging, and thus more worthy, that a determined 
Foucaultian reader could find under such an analysis. This might be less the case if 
the community celebration was of a marginalized, newly-emerging, or persecuted 
group, or if the performance scholar identified with the traditions of applied or 
community theatre (which, while rare in some parts of the world, is less so in the 
UK). This would not apply to the progressive Jews of North London.  
 Finally, I want to mention the affective and temporal work that performance 
scholars might note in this event. They would focus particularly on the tactility of the 
ritual’s acts: holding the hand of the scribe, the tactile act of inscription, guiding the 
inked quill over the parchment with its outlined but incomplete letters, the crush of 
people moving in, the embrace of the Torah scroll itself, the group dancing and 
procession and the close quarters. They might also note the focus on the gaze: the 
enormous large-group focus on a few dozen small black letters, each with their own 
tiny serifs and adornments, on the act of becoming a spectacle on the public streets, of 
being met by the public gaze of neighbours and strangers and the awareness (and 
perhaps fear) of what that could mean. These are all powerfully affective gestures, 
and the experience of these events is a constellation of these affects, which reinforce 
and overlap with one another and whose contradictions needs to be negotiated. A 
performance scholar might also note how both performances try to deepen this affect 
by engaging other models of temporality. The Hachnesat used the Terezin Tree to 
                                                 
16    To explain this point more fully: Bloch argues that rituals tend to be much more 
formalized and thus limiting in terms of the language, gesture, and other forms of 
communication they allow. Because of these limitations, these forms are effectively 
impoverished; they have less ability to pass on meaning than less restrictive communicative 
forms. Thus it is a bit incorrect to say that rituals have a ‘meaning.’ As, following Saussure, 
meaning requires the differentiation between one semantic option and another, then if a ritual 
is so formally restrictive as to not allow for any significant choice, then it cannot be said to 
have a meaning. Ritual songs, because they ‘almost completely predict the linguistic journey 
that the singer undertakes,’ are necessarily in a situation where ‘no argument can be 
communicated.’ (Ibid., p. 71). This form of communication has ‘no propositional force. It has 
only illocutionary force’ (Ibid., p. 76). And so Block sees religion as formally opposed to 
politics. Politics, he argues, is based on argumentation, and thus needs agile linguistic tools 
with which to address a variety of people and situations. Ritual, based on persuasion and the 
assertion of agreement, has no such need. 
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build a link between this celebration and the older, now largely lost Jewish traditions 
of Europe. (In fact, many of the other Torah scrolls that the synagogue uses are ones 
that were hidden by the Czech Jewish community during WW II, which saved them 
from destruction; the new Torah is thus another link in this chain of continuity.) What 
was being celebrated, then, was not just the current act of completion but the 
continuity of Jewish liturgical life going back, symbolically, to Sinai.  
 
 
4 
There are many other ways that performance scholars could read these performances, 
of course. I do not at all want to suggest that what I just offered is an exhaustive 
reading, or even a thorough one. But my intention here is to present an interesting and 
useful counterpoint to the anthropological reading detailed above. In this final section, 
I would like to use this case study to begin a dialogue between these two approaches,  
  This task is harder than it might appear because of disciplinary specialisation. 
Though performance studies, as a discipline, owes its origin to the collaboration 
between the theatre director and scholar Richard Schechner and the anthropologist of 
religion Victor Turner in New York in the 1970s, the two disciplines have since 
drifted much farther apart. While performance studies has recently taken up 
philosophy as an academic partner, the discipline has not renewed its relationship 
with anthropology or sociology. While performance scholars certainly have an 
interest in religious ritual, this has not extended to an acquaintance with the academic 
sociological or anthropological study of religion. Whatever one thinks of Ronald 
Grimes’s effort to deploy this intellectual tradition to build better, more effective 
rituals for the modern age,17 it’s virtually unknown to most performance scholars, 
even to those practice-based researchers who might be thought to be most sympathetic 
with it. 
 Nor do contemporary cultural anthropologists often engage with their 
performance studies colleagues. When anthropology does look to performance studies, 
it has a hard time finding a dialogue partner with which it can work. Many religious 
scholars see in performance studies a poetic but vague monism that they have worked 
hard to eliminate from their own discipline. Few ritual theorist have engaged more 
with notions of performance and performativity than Bell. But even she struggles to 
find much that can be of use in that dialogue: 
Perhaps the greatest challenge to current performance theory 
[in its conversation with religious studies] lies in its tendency 
                                                 
17  See Ronald Grimes. Deeply Into the Bone: Re-Inventing Rites of Passage (Berkeley: 
Univ. of California Press, 2002).  
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to flirt with universalism, that is, to substitute performance for 
an older notions of ritual in order to create a new, general 
model of action.18  
This charge of ‘flirting with universalism’ is particularly damning for Bell precisely 
because of her political concerns that I mentioned above. Religious scholars tend to be 
hugely wary of how universalist claims can serve as a palatable mask for normative 
ones, especially those with a colonial history. One major strand of the comparative 
study of religion was born out of a break with the Christian tradition of the apologetic 
and missionary engagement with other religions. With that in mind, as I mentioned, 
cultural anthropology is especially wary of the excessive vague claims to unities 
across mythologies of some of its 19th century forefathers, especially the so-called 
Cambridge Anthropologists and James Frazer. For E.B. Tylor, the founding father of 
cultural anthropology, religion was effectively a fossilized form of (unified) primitive 
thought that would inevitably decay with human progress. Tylor saw religion—and 
other forms of culture—in evolutionary terms. He famously wrote in his 1881 classic, 
Anthropology, that 
History, so far as it reaches back, shows arts, sciences, and 
political institutions beginning in ruder states, and becoming 
in the course of ages, more intelligent, more systematic, more 
perfectly arranged or organized, to answer their purposes.19  
This might be somewhat more nuanced than a Christian polemicist who arranged all 
the religions of the world on a one-dimensional scale from the most heathen to the 
most Protestant, but only somewhat. Contemporary religious scholars feel an 
understandable need to distance themselves from this aspect of their discipline’s past.  
 In an effort to build that distance in the last few decades, some scholars have 
sought to make the study of religion into a true social science, conducted with all the 
statistical rigour and attempted objectivity of sociology. Other anthropologists have 
called for a more reflexive, self-critical understanding of the scholar’s position in 
observing and analyzing religious life. But neither of these is particularly compatible 
with the ludic, fluid, paradox-loving and always-already-self-undermining 
inclinations of performance studies. Anthropologists worry that the performative ludic 
may serve as an unintentional vehicle for dangerously totalizing judgements.  
 While I understand this concern, I think it is misplaced. The tension around 
totalization is, in fact, one of the areas in which performance studies can offer a useful 
                                                 
18  Catherine Bell. ‘Performance,’ in Critical Terms in Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. 
Taylor (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 218. 
19  E.B. Tylor, Anthropology: An Introduction to the Study of Man and Civilization 
(London: Macmillan and Co., 1881), p. 15 
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perspective to scholars of religion. Performance studies has paid a great deal of 
attention to both the ephemeral temporality of performance and the ways in which it 
echoes after the event itself is over. As performance theorist Peggy Phelan famously 
wrote:  
Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented or 
otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of 
representations: once it does so, it becomes something other 
than performance.20 
The ephemerality of performance is not simply a question of a quirk of its form; it is 
part of its very ontology. Performances do not just happen to end; their temporal 
finality is part of what they are about. Thus, while of course performances have 
echoes and aftereffects, which have often been discussed with the language of 
haunting,21 those effects have a difficult time achieving the level of unquestioning 
truths because they are necessarily memories or resonances of an event that is 
necessarily over. This ontology of disappearance does not depend on performances 
being somehow artworks, nor does it depend on either the uniqueness or 
repetitiveness of any particular instance of a performance. Seeing religious life as 
being composed of particular acts, rather than necessarily as the working out of 
permanent doctrines, is a suggestion from performance studies that religious scholars 
may wish to take up.22  
 The two disciplines take very different approaches to the notions of repetition 
and novelty. As a rule, performance studies tends to emphasize what differentiates 
each performance from others, while anthropology tends to privilege the connections. 
Of course, both are true – almost any performance stands within, and can be usefully 
understood within – a set of traditions, and almost any performance likewise is 
tailored for and responsive to the particular sociohistorical context in which it exists. 
How to talk about the users of tradition as thoughtful, creative, critical actors within 
that tradition is something anthropology might help teach performance studies. How 
to talk about not just the new, but the value of the new as such—what Natalie Heinich 
calls the ‘regime of singularly’ that rules the arts23—is something that performance 
                                                 
20  Peggy Phelan. Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 
146 
21  See, in particular, Joseph Roach, Cities of the Dead: Circum-Atlantic Performance 
(New York: Columbia Univ. Press 1996) and Marvin Carlson, The Haunted Stage: The 
Theatre as Memory Machine (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2003). 
22  This is developed further in the introduction to Chambers, du Toit and Edelman, 
Performing Religion in Public.  
23  See the useful discussion in Rudi Laermans, ‘Natalie Heinich, sociologist of the arts: 
a critical appraisal.’ Boekmancahier 12, no 46 (2000), pp. 389-402. 
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studies has developed useful tools for, and these may be of use to religious studies. 
After all, the Hachnesat was a ritual, but it was a unique one. It was designed and 
created for a single event and will never be performed that way again. This is not, in 
fact, unusual for religious rituals. The fact that it was a singular event does not 
necessarily make the Hachnesat any less of a ritual, and the fact that it fell into a ritual 
pattern does not necessarily make its design any less creative. Performance studies 
has developed useful tools to understand the creative interworkings of novelty and 
tradition together, not antagonistically.  
 And finally, the issue of ritual efficacy should be raised. The Hachnesat did 
not just create certain affects: it accomplished a goal for the community. This might 
seem like an aspect where ritual and theatre diverge; ritual has genuine social efficacy 
while the aesthetic frame means that while theatre can play at transformation, it is 
prevented from actually accomplishing it. But, like the distinction between ordinary 
action and ritual action, this line too may be less clear than it might first appear. The 
affective and intellectual transformations which performances can create are every bit 
as real as the transition from parchment to scripture. The ways in which theatre 
effecting real and enduring social transformations has been studied (n different, 
interesting guises) by a number of theatre and performance scholars. Erika Fischer-
Lichte describes the transformative power or performance, Jill Dolan finds ‘fleeting 
moments of utopia’ in the theatre, and Hans van Maanen follows the consequences of 
the Kantian idea that the d intrinsic purpose of art is the proposing of new metaphors–
which, for the theatre, means proposing new metaphors for how we are to live 
together.24 Yes, the events themselves disappear, but the social transformations, 
images of utopia, or new models for social life that artistic performances propose can 
have effective political echoes and effects.  
 Parallel to this, we should not assume that religious rites of passage always 
have the effectiveness that they claim for themselves. In classic discussion of 
pilgrimage, Victor Turner makes a distinction between existential communitas and 
normative communitas. The former is the sweeping sense of basic human 
commonality and equality that we associate with the liminal and the mystical. The 
latter is just enough of it to provide an affective underpinning to and justification for 
some truly repressive and unequal political systems.25 Those rituals which seem to 
                                                 
24  Erika Fisher-Lichte. The Transformative Power of Performance (London: Routledge, 
2008). Jill Dolan. Utopia in Performance: Finding Hope at the Theatre (Ann Arbor: Univ. of 
Michigan Press, 2005). Hans van Maanen. How to Study Art Worlds: On the Societal 
Functioning of Aesthetic Value (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Univ. Press, 2009), esp. pp. 151ff.  
25  See Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (New York: 
Penguin, 1974), p. 131ff. 
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make a claim to existential communitas but in fact reinforce the status quo may, in 
fact, have less of a social effect than artistic performances which provide a fleeting 
glimpse of a fictional utopia. The relevant distinction regarding efficacy, I would 
argue, is not between religion and theatre but between different structural models of 
rites of passage: those which rely on an authority which is passed from one individual 
to another, and those, like the Hachnesat, in which the community creates a transition 
as a whole, even if there is professional leadership guiding this.  
 This kind of analysis, of the particular social and affective work done by a 
ritual performance such as the Hachnesat, is one that scholars of both performance 
and religion can undertake productively. As I have argued, these two disciplines 
operate on overlapping subject matters with quite different assumptions and working 
methods, and therefore, their analyses reveal very different things about these 
performances and what they model of social performativity. Though they are rarely 
linked, these two forms of analysis are not, in either principle or practice, 
incompatible with one another. The lack of dialogue between them reflects their 
divergent history, a difference that, while we ought to acknowledge and respect, we 
need not accept as a permanent limitation. To leave the gap unbridged would be a pity. 
Our analyses of complex, social, political, affective and effective rituals such as the 
Hachnesat would be richer and more fruitful if we were able to draw on both of these 
intellectual traditions. 
 
   
  
 
